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MiFID and Reg NMS 
A test-case for ‘substituted compliance’? 
Karel Lannoo 
his paper explores whether MiFID and Reg NMS could be accepted as equivalent by regulators on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Apart from many similarities, the most important one being that the main purpose of both measures is to 
enforce best execution in equity trading, there are many differences as well in the definition of best execution, the 
structures of the markets, and the role and powers of supervisory authorities. It calls upon the European Commission to 
make a detailed comparison between both measures and to take the opportunity to negotiate a mutual recognition agreement 
with the US. 
 
Introduction 
Two substantive pieces of legislation came into force on 
both sides of the Atlantic at roughly the same time – MiFID 
in the EU and Reg NMS in the US – both aimed at updating 
regulation to reflect technological changes and market 
developments. Should this coincidence be taken as a sign of 
a well-functioning regulatory dialogue or of capital market 
integration? At the heart of each regulation is the 
introduction and specification of the best execution concept. 
MiFID (Markets in Financial Instruments Directive) intends 
to complete the process started with the 1993 Investment 
Services Directive (ISD) and further liberalises Europe’s 
capital markets, by abolishing the monopoly of exchanges. 
Reg NMS (Regulation National Market System) aims to 
modernise and strengthen the National Market System 
(NMS) for equity securities trading. Although the latter is 
more limited in scope than MiFID, a closer look reveals 
substantial differences in the regulation of equity trading on 
both continents. With the establishment of the first 
transatlantic exchange and the significant activity of several 
large firms in both markets, the question emerges whether a 
managed convergence approach is feasible and desirable, or 
whether this will come about as a result of market forces. 
In comparing these two pieces of regulation, one needs to 
keep in mind the substantial differences in the market and 
regulatory structure on the two sides of the Atlantic. The US 
has a much longer tradition of securities markets regulation 
than the EU, but at the same time it has kept elements that 
Europe has abandoned in the meantime. Reg NMS is a 
further adaptation of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act, 
which laid the basis of the US structure as we know it today, 
with a powerful regulator, the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission), at the centre, but with important powers 
assigned to self-regulatory organisations (SROs). EU efforts 
to create a single capital market started in the 1980s, with the 
Investment Services Directive as the centrepiece. This 
happened against the background of limited experience with 
capital market regulation at member state level, a 
heterogeneous supervisory structure and a high degree of 
self-regulation. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
succeeded in streamlining this structure, but largely 
eliminated self-regulation. 
This ECMI Policy Brief starts with an overview of the key 
points of both measures. In a second step, a closer analysis is 
made of the definition of best execution as provided for in 
each measure, and the effects it will have on the market. In a 
third part, we analyse whether and how both pieces of 
regulation could become part of the regulatory dialogue 
between the EU and the US and ask whether the new 
approach of ‘substituted compliance’ could be applied.  
MiFID and Reg NMS in a nutshell 
Although “omnis comparatio claudicat” (every comparison 
is to some extent flawed), the similarities between the two 
regulations are too great to simply chalk them up to 
coincidence. Reg NMS is based on the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act, which requires that investors receive financial 
and other relevant information concerning securities being 
offered for public sale; and prohibits deceit, 
misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities. 
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To enforce these stipulations, the Act created the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and endowed it with large rule-
making powers. Many of the current US securities laws are 
based upon this Act. The ISD and MiFID are based upon the 
EU Treaty, and their objective is to create a single market. 
EU directives or regulations flesh out and detail the relevant 
freedoms set forth in the EU Treaty, namely the free 
provision of services and the free movement of capital. 
MiFID 
The ISD, which was adopted in 1993, introduced the 
freedom to provide services for exchanges, i.e. licensed 
regulated markets, and broker dealers in the EU. Although 
the directive clearly had a liberalising effect, the 
harmonisation of conduct of business rules was insufficiently 
detailed, with the effect that free provision of services did 
not work effectively on a cross-border basis, especially for 
retail clients. To correct this shortcoming, MiFID introduces 
a far-reaching degree of harmonisation of conduct of 
business rules, aimed at achieving a single rule in the EU. In 
addition, it abolishes the option provided by the ISD for the 
concentration of trades on the regulated market, and allows 
systemic internalisation of equity trading by banks. 
The key provisions of MiFID are as follows: 
  A far-reaching harmonisation of conduct of business 
rules for securities trading, including strict rules on best 
execution of trades, client categorisation and client 
reporting;  
  Rules on the internal governance of investment firms, 
requiring them to tackle conflicts of interest, maintain 
good governance and ensure continuity of their services; 
  Abolition of the concentration rules of the ISD, by 
which member states could require trades to be executed 
on the main exchange or the ‘regulated market’; 
  Systematic internalisation of trades, subject to strict pre- 
and post-trade transparency requirements within certain 
thresholds, or less limited above that; 
  A European passport for Multilateral Trading Facilities 
(MTFs), which can be created by investment firms and 
exchanges; and 
  The extension of the single passport regime to some 
other services (investment advice and non-discretionary 
asset management) and some other markets 
(commodities, more derivative instruments). 
MiFID is also one of the first EU financial regulation 
directives to assign extensive scope for implementing 
measures, i.e. secondary (or ‘level-2’ in Lamfalussy 
parlance) legislation, to the EU Securities Committee, which 
is composed of Ministry of Finance officials of the member 
states and chaired by the European Commission. Some 20 of 
the 73 articles of the ‘level 1’ (or framework) Directive 
assign implementing powers to this committee, shielded 
from direct parliamentary scrutiny. Implementing measures, 
consisting of a directive and a regulation, were adopted in 
September 2006 (see reference in Table 1), and almost 
double the total size of the ‘level 1’ Directive. 
The ISD is credited with having allowed trading in stocks to 
concentrate on the home market of the listed companies, and 
hence to enhance liquidity, reduce spreads and improve the 
price discovery process. It also brought increased 
competition between financial centres and more 
concentration of business in certain centres. 
Reg NMS 
While the core issue of the debate generated by Reg NMS 
was similar to that of MiFID, i.e. to what extent does one 
need to concentrate securities trading for the sake of liquidity 
and an orderly price formation process, the outcome was 
radically different in each case. Reg NMS protects the 
incumbent stock exchanges against competition from 
‘alternative’ markets, whereas MiFID increases the 
competition to exchanges. Unlike in Europe, which had seen 
a concentration of blue chip trades on the home stock 
exchanges, the US had experienced a much stronger growth 
of alternative execution venues, such as internalisers, ECNs, 
ATSs and crossing networks, raising concerns with 
regulators that it reduces market liquidity, diminishes the 
price discovery process and dampens the appetite of 
investors to display limit orders. But the SEC’s solution was 
certainly not uncontroversial, as illustrated by the formal and 
open dissent of Commissioners Paul S. Atkins and Cynthia 
A. Glassman to the adoption of Reg NMS (see Atkins & 
Glassman, 2005). 
Reg NMS builds upon the establishment of the National 
Market System (NMS) from 1975. The latter was intended to 
connect the different individual markets that trade securities, 
through a unified system that links the different buy and sell 
orders in a particular stock in order to give the best quote to 
investors. This culminated in the establishment of the Inter-
market Trading System (ITS), which did not include 
NASDAQ. NMS aimed to simulate competition between 
markets and competition for individual orders. The first 
should stimulate innovation of trading systems, the second 
efficient pricing of stocks. Unlike other national markets, 
which are dominated by a single public market, the SEC 
asserts that the US has vigorous competition between 
different types of markets, including national and regional 
exchanges with different degrees of automation, purely 
electronic markets, market-making securities dealers and 
automated matching systems.
2 In its words, the NMS has 
thus been “remarkably successful” in promoting market 
competition, but because of growing fragmentation, this has 
come at the expense of competition among orders for 
individual stock, affecting the quality of the price discovery 
process, the market depth and liquidity. Hence, there is a 
need for tighter regulation of best execution. 
Reg NMS contains the following four key provisions: 
•  Order protection rule. Designed to enforce best 
execution and protect limit orders, this rule reinforces 
the fundamental principle of obtaining the best price for 
investors when such price is represented by quotations 
that are immediately accessible for automatic execution 
in trading centres. It requests firms to have written 
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policies and procedures in place to prevent trade-
throughs for NMS stock, which occur when trades are 
executed without regard for immediately available and 
better-priced quotations in other trading centres. Trade-
throughs reduce liquidity and transparency and increase 
transaction costs. They also discourage investors from 
displaying limit orders, which are seen to be the building 
blocks of price discovery and efficient markets. There 
are many exceptions to the rule, for example, for 
intermarket sweep orders (block transactions), flickering 
quotes and benchmark trades, which raise questions 
about enforcement. 
•  Access rule. Establishing fair and efficient access to 
quotations in NMS stock, the rule enables the use of 
private linkages by a variety of connectivity providers. It  
limits the fee a trading centre can charge to access 
protected quotations to no more than €0.003 per share. 
And it requires SROs to maintain written rules 
prohibiting their members from locking or crossing 
protected quotations of other trading centres. 
•  Sub-penny rule. This prohibits market participants from 
displaying, ranking or accepting quotations that are 
priced at an increment of less than 1 cent, unless the 
quotation is less than $1.  
•  Market data rules. These amend the rules for the 
functioning of the single market data consolidator, 
changing the formula for the allocation of the revenues 
to provide the right incentives to those SROs that 
provide the most useful data for investors. 
 
Table 1. MiFID vs. Reg NMS at a snapshot 
  MiFID Reg  NMS 
Objective/scope  •  Upgrade Investment Services Directive (ISD) 
•  Further integrate Europe’s capital markets through 
a single set of conduct of business rules 
•  Strengthen and modernise regulatory 
structure of US equity markets 
•  Reflect technological and market 
developments 
Main measures  •  Abolition of concentration rule for trading and data 
•  Best execution 
•  Harmonised MTF regime 
•  Rules on systematic internalisation 
•  Order protection rule 
•  Access rule 
•  Sub-penny rule 
•  Market data rules 
Trading venue 
classification 
•  Regulated markets 
•  MTFs 
•  Systematic internalisers 
•  Fast markets (automated quotes) 
•  Slow markets (manual quotes) 
Best execution approach  •  Several parameters (price, costs, speed …), 
depending on characteristics of client, order, 
financial instrument and venue 
•  Prior consent for internalisation 
•  Policy to be set by firms, to be reviewed annually 
•  Price precedes 
•  Prohibition of ‘trade-throughs’  
•  Firms are requested to maintain written 
policies 
Regulatory authorities  European Commission, ESC, CESR, national 
authorities 
SEC, SROs 
Entry into force  1 November 2007  Over a series of five dates starting in October 
2006 and ending 8 October 2007 
Likely market impact  •  Increased competition among trading venues 
•  Concentration on sell side 
•  Markets to become fully electronic 
•  Protection of larger markets, supports 
liquidity 
•  Further concentration, international 
mergers 
Problems  •  Compliance costs: Industry needs to make 
important modifications to their order routing 
systems to obtain best price 
•  Demand for clarifications 
•  Request for delays 
•  Enforceability 
•  Compliance costs: Industry needs to make 
important modifications to their order 
routing systems to obtain best price 
•  Demand for clarifications 
•  Request for delays 
•  Enforceability 
Outstanding issues  •  Price transparency in bond markets 
•  Data consolidation 
•  Impact on buy side institutions (e.g. UCITS) 
•  Clearing and settlement 
•  Role of SROs 
•  Block trading 
Reference  Directive 2004/39/EC; implementing measures 
Commission Directive 2006/73/EC and Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 1287/2006 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-51808 (9 June 
2005) 
Size  128 pages in OJ; 67,000 words  52 pages (amendments to part 242 of the 
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The trade-through prohibition applies to automated 
quotations in all trading centres, that is, displayed quotations 
that are immediately accessible for execution in national 
securities exchanges, exchange specialists, ATSs, OTC 
market-makers and internalisers. Thus, according to the 
trade-through rule, once a best bid or offer has been posted 
for a stock, any order must be routed to that trading venue 
for execution. Unlike MiFID, the obligation of best 
execution thus also applies to exchanges under Reg NMS, 
but only for automated quotes. 
At first sight, both rules are thus highly comparable. 
Although MiFID is wider in scope than Reg NMS, which is 
solely concerned with equity markets, both measures impact 
market structure, set and define best execution and regulate 
the market for market data. Moreover, both also stimulated 
wide-ranging and polarised discussions. Both rules are 
coming into force at about the same time, and the 
expectation is that both measures will have a fundamental 
impact on market structure, as well on exchanges and their 
respective broker communities.  
A closer look reveals very substantial differences, however, 
demonstrating that each measure developed independently 
within its own institutional environment. There are important 
differences, for example, in the way each measure defines 
best execution: under MiFID, it is more of a principle, 
whereas it is a rule under Reg NMS. In defining best 
execution, MiFID takes a series of criteria and characteristics 
into account – thus allowing best execution requirements to 
be tailored to each investor’s profile – whereas price alone 
matters under Reg NMS. As a consequence, there are many 
exceptions to best execution under Reg NMS, whereas there 
are virtually none under MiFID, with the proviso of eligible 
counterparties. In addition, Reg NMS has some elements that 
are seen, from a European perspective, to be alien to a liberal 
economic system, as the US is viewed from Europe. The 
regulation if seen as a form of price regulation (the access 
rule and sub-penny rule) and mandates consolidation of 
equity market data in a single consolidator, with a complex 
method for allocating fees, whereas MiFID just opens 
market data to competition.  
 
Table 2. Best execution and market data rules in MIFID vs. Reg NMS 
 MiFID  Reg  NMS 
Best execution  Art. 21 of MiFID defines best execution as not only a 
matter of the price of a trade, but also “costs, speed, 
likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or 
any other consideration relevant to the execution of the 
order”. Investment firms are required to establish and 
implement order execution policies, including the 
factors affecting the order execution venue. These 
policies will be assessed by investment firms on a 
regular basis.  
Rule 602 b of Reg NMS obliges trading centres to 
execute buy and sell orders at the best price. Rule 611 
requires trading centres to establish, maintain and 
enforce written policies that are designed to prevent 
trade-throughs of protected quotations. The trading 
centre must perform regular surveillance to ensure the 




MiFID liberalises data markets, without imposing a 
structure. Regulated markets (Art. 45), MTFs (Art. 30) 
and systematic internalisers (Art. 28) are requested “to 
make public the price, volume and time of the 
transactions … as close to real time as possible … [and] 
on a reasonable commercial basis”.   
NMS instituted a single data consolidator. Reg NMS 
gives more freedom to SROs to disseminate their trade 
reports independently, but still requires them to 
communicate best prices to the data consolidator. 
 
As has been vividly demonstrated by the US Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, capital markets are increasingly interconnected 
and globalised. Rules that are seen to be too burdensome or 
protective will turn business away to other centres. 
Specifically in equity trading, in the context of large broker 
dealers with a global presence, trading in stocks can easily 
be moved to other jurisdictions. Moreover, with the opening 
of the first transatlantic exchange and a second one in the 
near future, integrated transatlantic trading floors will soon 
emerge, facilitating the execution of trades under the most 
favourable regime. Should the MiFID-Reg NMS nexus 
therefore be discussed urgently in the context of the EU-US 
regulatory dialogue? Or should one expect the dictates of the 
market to resolve any problems? Based on our analysis of 
the expected effects of both measures, this subject is 
addressed in the next section. 
Comparative effects of MiFID and Reg NMS  
While it is still too early to assess the effects of both 
measures on the markets, there is broad criticism in the US 
that Reg NMS is excessively protectionist, prescriptive and 
anti-competitive. The open dissent of two SEC 
Commissioners to the adoption of Reg NMS is probably the 
clearest sign of this criticism, but there were also wide-
ranging and contentious debate throughout the country prior 
to the adoption of the measure (which is summarised in the 
437 pages preceding the text of adopted rules). MiFID has 
also been heavily criticised as being burdensome, 
excessively detailed and costly, although there a timid 
consensus is emerging that its long-term effects could be 
positive for Europe’s capital markets as a result of its 
market-opening effects, albeit with some caveats. 
As with MiFID, Reg NMS is expected to provide markets 
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that allow them to be more responsive to the speed of 
execution and thus to market efficiency. It entices manual 
venues to accelerate their automation process. It places the 
different execution venues on a more equal footing and does 
away with the asymmetric regulation that existed before. It is 
expected to stimulate consolidation and reduce the number 
of alternative trading venues in the US, a trend that was 
already evident over the last two years (Gentzoglanis, 2006). 
At the same time, however, it protects the dominant 
exchange, which has the liquidity advantage to offer the best 
price. But this may slow future innovation in US equity 
trading (Gkantinis, 2006).   
The criticism expressed by SEC Commissioners Atkins & 
Glassman (2005) focused on the prohibition of trade-
throughs, which, in their opinion, is not warranted. They 
claim that the figures used on trade-throughs by the SEC, 
which point to a degree of fragmentation, were not correctly 
measured, and do not point to a lack of liquidity (pp. 9-19). 
They assert that Reg NMS will not achieve its goals. Current 
trade-through rates do not mandate the action proposed, nor 
will its prohibition improve best execution (pp. 20-21). In 
addition, they argue that narrowing-down best execution to 
the price criterion reduces competition to the detriment of 
other factors of execution quality, and to the detriment of the 
market structure and innovation (p. 30). According to the 
Commissioners, the trade-through rule imposes government- 
controlled competition, increases barriers to competition and 
represents a misguided attempt to micro-manage the 
markets. The Commissioners also criticised the 
’codification’ of the single data consolidator model, which 
“grants a monopoly for the consolidation of market data”, 
constituting another barrier to competition and increasing the 
cost of implementation (pp. 41-42). This criticism has also 
been voiced by academics (see e.g. Blume, 2007 and 
Wallison, 2006).  
These critical remarks are a useful reminder of the context of 
the European MiFID debate. While the market environments 
are similar on both sides of the Atlantic, the EU has taken a 
radically different route, which is more in line with the 
criticism voiced by the two US Commissioners. The most 
serious criticism one could level at MiFID, and which was 
an important issue during the discussions of the directive, 
was that it would contribute to fragmentation. Hence, the 
last-minute addition of pre-trade price transparency for 
internalisers. Nevertheless, overall, regulation under MiFID 
goes in the opposite direction from Reg NMS. It abolishes 
monopolies and opens up the securities markets to more 
competition. Whereas exchanges have exercised a formal or 
effective monopoly in many EU markets until today, this 
changes radically under MiFID, which allows three forms of 
execution venues (exchanges, multilateral trading facilities 
and systematic internalisers), and also opens up the market 
for (equity) financial market data. Hence, with a 
restructuring of today’s regulated markets, the emergence of 
new specialised regulated markets and MTFs, a much higher 
degree of competition can be expected between execution 
venues. Moreover, exchanges will also face challenges to 
their financial market data revenues. From a best-execution 
perspective, the biggest challenge for market operators will 
be to provide fast linkages between all these execution 
venues to allow best execution to work in practice, as exists 
in the US. If they fail to meet this challenge, Europe could be 
heading towards the same situation the SEC is trying to 
avoid with Reg NMS, that is, strong competition between 
markets, but achieved at the expense of a transparent and 
effective price formation process. 
The jury is still out as to which form of best execution will 
prove to be the most effective. Even if in theory it may be 
better to have a broader set of criteria to judge best 
execution, this may give rise to arbitrariness and create legal 
uncertainty. The broad set of criteria under MiFID gives 
firms a large degree of flexibility and discretion in applying 
best execution, adapted to the wishes of their clients, but at 
the same time it creates uncertainty as to which 
interpretation supervisors will apply. This argues in favour 
of Reg NMS, which is one-dimensional, clearer and easier to 
apply for regulators (Gentzoglanis, 2006). The laborious 
discussions surrounding the implementation of MiFID’s best 
execution provisions in the context of CESR and the 
concerns expressed by intermediaries about the priority of 
the criteria are an early warning of the possible difficulties to 
come in Europe. In addition, these rules can be implemented 
differently at national level by the EU member states, 
whereas the US has a single body in charge. 
A test-case for ‘substituted compliance’? 
In a remarkable change of policy direction, the SEC has 
recently indicated an interest in a form of selective bilateral 
mutual recognition to adapt to growing international 
portfolio diversification of US investors.
3 In the past, the 
SEC strictly applied the territoriality principle, which meant 
that foreign providers of services on US territory were asked 
to follow US rules. The principle was adduced, for example, 
as the justification for forbidding the display of screens of 
foreign exchanges in the US.
4 Under the new regime, the 
SEC would negotiate a bilateral ‘substituted compliance’ 
regime with another regime deemed to be substantially 
comparable to the US. This would be based on an initial 
agreement on minimum standards and information-sharing 
arrangements. Could the MiFID Reg NMS conundrum be a 
test case for this new regime? 
The concept of ‘substituted compliance’, a phrase coined by 
Tafara & Peterson (2007), is comparable to the mutual 
recognition approach, bolstered by minimum harmonisation, 
as we know it in the context of the EU’s single market. It has 
been experimented with in the context of the EU-US 
regulatory dialogue, which started in February 2002, 
between the European Commission on the one hand, and the 
US Treasury Department and the respective US supervisory 
authorities on the other. It has for example led to agreements 
on the equivalence of rules for auditor oversight (March 
2004) and the equivalence of accounting standards (April 
2005 and 2006). Although there are many elements of 
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4 The Multi-jurisdictional Disclosure System, concluded 
between Canada and the US in 1985, is an exception to this 
principle. It provides for mutual recognition of securities 
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comparability and pressing market developments, MiFID 
and Reg NMS have so far not been discussed in detail in the 
context of this dialogue.
5 A possible structure for mutual 
recognition in the areas of trading screens and broker dealers 
is developed by Tafara & Peterson (2007).  
The justification for substituted compliance is to bring more 
competition to both the US capital market and the US 
regulatory model as well as to reduce transaction costs. It 
would create more investment opportunities at a lower cost 
with greater protection. In this context, Tafara-Peterson draw 
a distinction between regulatory competition and regulatory 
arbitrage. Since the SEC would only be interested in 
concluding a bilateral agreement with a jurisdiction with a 
similar regulatory philosophy, involving a considerable 
degree of prudential and information-sharing, there would be 
no ‘race to the bottom’. On the contrary, by setting minimum 
standards, poorly regulated markets would have the incentive 
to upgrade their regulatory system to gain access, thereby 
triggering a ‘race towards optimality’ (Tafara & Peterson, 
2007, p. 67). Investors would be protected by a mandatory 
disclosure statement informing them that trading conducted 
on a foreign stock exchange or through a foreign broker 
dealer may entail different forms of protection. This would at 
the same time insulate the US market from any adverse 
effects arising from these trades (p. 57). Only fraud would 
remain fully subject to US provisions. 
The proposed framework would consist of a four-step 
process: 
1)  The foreign firm would submit a request to the SEC 
seeking an exemption from registration. 
2)  Discussions would be held between the SEC and the 
home country regulator of the foreign entity, based 
initially on an assessment of the degree to which the two 
countries’ prudential rules and enforcement capabilities 
are comparable. A second step would involve technical 
arrangements regarding enforcement, inspections and 
information- sharing arrangements, requiring a high 
degree of oversight coordination between both 
regulators. This could be laid down in a bilateral 
arrangement in the form of a memorandum of 
understanding (MoU). 
3)  A dialogue would then ensue between the SEC and the 
firm petitioning access. 
4)  A public notice of the request by the foreign firm and 
solicitation of comments would then be posted, followed 
by the final decision. 
Apart from the standard assessment criteria of exchanges and 
broker dealers, the comparability assessment would also 
cover disclosure rules for securities issuers and a broader 
assessment of the general legal and enforcement 
comparability of the host country. The extension of 
reciprocal access to US firms in the host country would be 
an important criterion in granting exemption. 
                                                        
5 SEC Commissioner Campos suggested in a speech to a 
conference in Amsterdam to discuss MiFID and Reg NMS 
between the EU and the SEC (see Campos, 2007). 
Tafara-Peterson insist that exemption will only be granted to 
exchanges and broker dealers if “all the objectives of the 
SEC’s registration and oversight regime are otherwise met 
by the comparable regulatory regime in the … home 
jurisdiction” (p. 64). They will in addition need to provide a 
clear risk disclosure statement to US investors that the orders 
or transactions are not subject to SEC oversight (p. 65). 
Foreign broker dealers will need to maintain in a separate 
account assets in an amount that at least is sufficient to cover 
all their current obligations to US investors. 
Does this new scheme finally provide easier access for EU 
exchanges and broker dealers to the US market? This is still 
an open question, in light of the brief comparisons drawn 
above between MiFID and Reg NMS. Possible problems 
might arise before granting exemption as a result of the 
following differences in the two systems: 
-  the definition of best execution, and the role of 
execution venues in applying best execution, 
-  the role played by data consolidators in both markets, 
-  the role and performance of clearing and settlement 
systems, and 
-  the supervisory set-up on both sides, with a big role for 
self-regulatory organisations in the US, and varying 
degrees of supervisory effectiveness and enforcement in 
the EU. 
The EU has long insisted that EU companies should be 
granted greater reciprocal access to US capital markets. The 
European Commission should take this opportunity to make 
a detailed comparison between the requirements for 
exchanges and broker dealers in both jurisdictions, as a basis 
for a bilateral agreement between both jurisdictions. It 
should demonstrate how certain provisions of MiFID 
provide more advantageous access for US firms to the EU 
market than vice versa. It should also emphasise the high 
degree of investor protection as contained in MiFID’s best 
execution provision and other aspects of its conduct of 
business rules. 
Conclusion 
Although MiFID and Reg NMS may at first sight seem 
comparable, because of the prominent role each assigns to 
best execution, the two regulations have developed 
independently within their respective markets and policy 
environments. Accordingly, they differ importantly in many 
regards. Seen from the EU, Reg NMS is more protective of 
US exchanges and execution venues providing automated 
execution, applies a narrower definition of best execution, 
contains outdated forms of price regulation and maintains a 
monopolistic data consolidator. MiFID, on the other hand, is 
more orientated towards market opening, but it may lead to a 
higher degree of order fragmentation, and hence reduce 
liquidity, if connectivity is not assured. It has a broad and 
flexible definition of best execution, but this raises at the 
same time two weak points: enforceability and precisely how 
it would be enforced by national authorities. 
The coming into force of MiFID provides a unique 
opportunity for the EU to negotiate a mutual recognition 
agreement with the US to allow reciprocal access to MiFID and Reg NMS: A test-case for ‘substituted compliance’| 7 
exchanges and broker-dealers. With MiFID, the policy goals 
for regulating both sets of institutions have come much 
closer, as have also many of the detailed provisions. 
Although it is still early days to judge whether the SEC is 
really willing to move to some form of mutual recognition, 
the European Commission should seize upon this 
opportunity and actively start to explore the differences and 
similarities of the regulatory regimes governing brokers and 
exchanges on both sides of the Atlantic. This would give 
European exchanges and banks much better access to the US 
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The European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) was established as an independent non-
profit organisation in October 1993, in a collaborative effort by the European Federation 
of Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS), the Federation of European Securities 
Exchanges (FESE) and the International Securities Market Association (ISMA), now the 
International Capital Market Association (ICMA). ECMI is managed and staffed by the 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels. Its membership is composed of 
exchanges, banks, trade associations and academics. 
European capital markets have experienced rapid growth in recent years, corresponding 
to the gradual shift away from relationship banking as a source of funding and at the 
same time, have had to absorb and implement the massive output of EU-level regulation 
required to create a single market for financial services. These developments, combined 
with the immense challenges presented to European financial institutions by the 
globalisation of financial markets, highlight the importance of an independent entity to 
undertake and disseminate research on European capital markets. 
The principal objective of ECMI is therefore to provide a forum in which market 
participants, policy-makers and academics alike can exchange ideas and opinions 
concerning the efficiency, stability, liquidity, integrity, fairness and competitiveness of 
European capital markets and discuss the latest market trends. These exchanges are 
fuelled by the publications ECMI regularly produces for its members: quarterly 
newsletters, annual reports, a statistical package, regular commentary and research 
papers, as well as occasional workshops and conferences. ECMI also advises European 
regulators on policy-related matters, acts as a focal point for interaction between 
academic research, market sentiment and the policy-making process, and promotes a 
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